Salient Differences and Evolution of Rules of Evidence, Victim’s Rights, the “Armed Conflict” Element, and Structure in the ICTY and ICTR

Salient Differences and Evolution of Rules of Evidence, Victim’s Rights, the “Armed Conflict” Element, and Structure in the ICTY and ICTR

Written by Jeremy S. Bates

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for:
Legal Studies Course - Crimes Against Humanity
Instructor: Dr Jens Meierhenrich
Harvard University


ABSTRACT:

Significant differences in procedure and definition have occurred in, at least, the areas of: rules of evidence, victim’s rights, the “Armed Conflict” element, judges, and the overall structure of international criminal tribunal proceedings in ICTY and ICTR. It has been difficult to base proceedings on earlier proceedings, including Nuremberg and the War Crimes Trial at Tokyo. Have these modifications strengthened or weakened the threat of justice for future aggressors?
 
What progress has the ICTY and ICTR made in relation to rules of evidence, victim’s rights, the “armed conflict” element of crimes against humanity charges, and other procedures and structure in international criminal law? The Rwandan, Srebrenician, and Potocarian massacres called for a distribution of justice the respective domestic criminal justice systems were unable to administer. With over 800,000 people slaughtered in Rwanda and thousands of Bosnian Muslim males in the former Yugoslavia, the convening of the international criminal tribunals illustrates a more global consciousness and even with their shortcomings, both the ICTY and the ICTR show that such crimes against humanity will not be tolerated, nor will vigilantism be resorted to as retribution. Though the international community failed to prevent the genocides, it applaudably did create international criminal tribunals, the ICTR and ICTY. This essay will review salient similarities and differences between the structure, judges, and trial and appeal chambers, of both tribunals and will conclude by illuminating some the effects on international legal precedent the sentences and rulings from both tribunals have had.
In spring of 1993 and near the end of the year in 1994, the Security Council of the United Nations determined that the situations in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda constituted threats to international peace and security. Accordingly, the Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, Security Council Resolution 827) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, Security Council Resolution 955) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Using Security Council Resolutions to establish the ICTY and the ICTR was necessary to make sure they would be established expeditiously and to ensure the cooperation of all States in whose territory might live those persons alleged to have violated international humanitarian law. The creation of the ICTY and ICTR is a significant new step by the international community to enforce international humanitarian law through criminal prosecutions. Both tribunals are subordinate organs of the Security Council within the definition of Article 29 of the UN Charter. They are also dependent in administrative and financial matters on various United Nations entities, but as a judicial institution, they are independent of any one State or group of States, including their parent body, the Security Council. This last fact is more clearly demonstrated in the 16 permanent and 12 ad litem judges in the ICTY and the 4 chambers, 16 permanent and 9 ad litem judges in the ICTR.
The pre-existence of the ICTY dictated that those establishing the ICTR adopt a similar legal approach. The ICTR Statute, drafted by the original sponsors of Resolution 955 and discussed by the Security Council, was an adaptation of the ICTY Statute. Certain organizational and institutional similarities were established to ensure a unity of legal approach, as well as economy and efficiency of resources.
Evidence
Both international tribunals differentiate between admitting varying types of evidence. Testimonial evidence may be contributed by a witness either in or out of court, via deposition or video-link. This is an interesting development as cross-examination via dual video-link, previous deposition, or delayed in person cross examination become more difficult. Further, such testimony may be delivered orally or in written form. Documents, objects, evidence of facts, and “expert” evidence may also be admitted as evidence. Generally, the ICTY and ICTR decide on evidence admittance based on whether admittance or denial of relevant evidence would be to the advantage of the accused.
New Evidence on Appeal and Review
As the ICTY Appeals Chamber noted, in Kupreskic, “while the right to a full appeal process is of the utmost importance, this right must be carefully balanced against the equally important requirement that an appeal be dealt with expeditiously…” and that, “only the gravest of circumstances would ‘justify further motions to admit additional evidence.’”
Exclusion of Evidence
The exclusion of evidence in the two tribunals is something of a confirmation of the U.S. Federal Rule of Evidence 403. For example, Rule 89(D) allows the Chamber the option to exclude evidence when its probative value is significantly outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial, and effectively counterbalances Rule 89(C). Rule 89(D), according to the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, does not prevent the admittance by either party, of hearsay evidence, in the form of a transcript of the testimony of a witness given in another trial. The ICTR (and SCSL) have put together the same concept, but without a separate stipulation in Rule 89. On the contrary, an ICTR Rule dictates that “nothing affects a Trial Chamber’s power under Rule 89(C) to exclude evidence ‘if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.’”
Rule 95 of the ICTY regarding illegally obtained evidence does not grant unconditional inadmissibility, unlike the case in some national jurisdictions. If the evidence in question has been secured “by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings,” it may not be admitted. Rightly so, the ends do not justify the means if evidence is stolen, coerced, or otherwise tainted to strengthen the prosecutor or the defense. Mistrials accompanying the admission of such contaminated evidence in international tribunals are not options and violations of procedure may increase the likelihood of acquitting a guilty party.
Impressive magnitudes of documents have been produced and submitted as evidence before both the ICTY and ICTR. In the ICTY this has been particularly true, since material gradually became obtainable as the varying governments in the Balkan region augmented their collaboration with the Prosecutor, after the tribunal was created.
Notwithstanding the “hate media” trial which began on 23 October 2000 and resulted in three convictions of those responsible for the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, as well as the Kangur newspaper, much less evidence exists, for the ICTR, in the way of written systematic or widespread planning records of previous events and of the crimes.
Hearsay
Hearsay is defined by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY as the “statement of a person made otherwise than in the proceedings in which it is tendered, but nevertheless being tendered in those proceedings in order to establish the truth of what that person says.” Unlike criminal courts, state and federal in the United States, the ICTY and ICTR, in general, admit hearsay and affidavit evidence. Given the uncommon scenarios and crimes committed, I would argue that in order to discover and ascertain as many facts of the case as possible such admittance is not only a good idea but legally and practically necessary. The ICTY Trial Chamber documented in Tadic, that its evidentiary administration was a fusion of common-law and civil law features and as such, did not stringently follow either jurisdiction. Though this may not be sufficiently stringent for some scholars’ views of jurisprudence, in two ICTR cases, applications from the Prosecutor to have evidence submitted before the Chamber started and after a trial had begun were both dismissed. So despite some leniency in ICTY and ICTR hearsay evidence admittance procedure is still to law what science is to the scientific method.
Victim’s Rights
In both the ICTY and ICTR, victims are neither allowed to participate in their personal capacity nor are they entitled to receive compensation or reparation for damages suffered. Accurately, the primary concern of the drafters of the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) of the ad hoc Tribunals seems to have been the appropriate punishment of serious violators of international humanitarian law. This main concern becomes more visible when one considers the wording of Resolution 827 (1993), which established the ICTY and states that it was launched "for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international law."
To comprehend why victims were not allowed a role in the proceedings, it must be remembered that the ad hoc Tribunals procedure has been based not on European legal structures but mainly on the U.S. adversarial system. The latter configuration holds that the victim's role is to appear as a witness for either party and as such may not search for reparation for any damages suffered; such pursuits being directed to civil proceedings in the US and domestic trials in international courts.
A corollary priority of the Statute drafters was to uphold the right of those accused to be speedily and fairly tried. After considering the scale and magnitude of the crimes over which the ad hoc Tribunals hold authority, involving hundreds of thousands of living and deceased victims (in the ICTR), the presence, testimony, and cross examination of each would excessively delay the proceedings and weaken the rights of the accused. At the Trial at Nuremberg, notwithstanding the impressive and necessary voluminous proceedings, not every living victim was brought to the proceedings, allowed to detail the atrocities, and remain for an examination by the defense and adding such precedent now is unrealistic.
For these and other reasons, the rights of victims to engage in and to receive compensation was put aside and the Prosecution was given the task of representing the victims collectively and at each stage of the judicial proceedings. Historically, the respective domestic courts decide upon victims receiving compensation awards.
The victim is excluded from the handling of the proceedings and neither the Statute nor the Rules permit victims any rights to get involved in the case with hopes of ensuring the protection of the victim’s legitimate interests. Personal grievances and loss of property, on an individual level, are not the focus of international tribunals. Articles 19(1) of the ICTR and 20(1) of the ICTY Statutes are resources of protection allotted to victims and grant that the Trial Chamber shall guarantee a balanced and prompt trial, with "full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses." Additional articles of both tribunals further stipulate that their respective rules of procedure and evidence will provide for the protection of victims and witnesses, with measures including the conduct of ex parte or in camera proceedings and the protection of the victim's identity. Throughout the trial, the victim may be heard only in his/her witness capacity and can only take part in the hearing at the clear and open request of the prosecutor or defense counsel. He/She must take the oath and be subject to contempt proceedings if falsehoods are spoken. The victim is allowed to speak in the context of the prosecutor’s examination and defense’s cross-examination. Such victims are not afforded representative lawyers when giving evidence and do not have any right of access to evidence offered throughout the trial. Victims are also not allowed to demand to be kept up to date regarding the progress of the trial, even where such proceedings are of personal concern to him/her.
Consistent with responding articles the Court may "order the return of any property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of duress, to their rightful owners." After judgment and conviction regarding a particular finding of illegal taking of property and at the request of Prosecutor or ex officio, the Trial Chamber may, conduct special hearings on the question of restitution. If the alleged property is in the hands of third parties who are not otherwise connected with the crime, they will be separately summoned before the Trial Chamber and given an opportunity to validate their claim to such possessions. After the proceedings, if the Trial Chamber can determine who the rightful owner is, it orders the appropriate restitution. If the Trial Chamber is unable to determine ownership, a request that the competent national authorities resolve the case may be made, and likewise order the restoration of the property. A subsequent rule provides that the Registrar must convey to relevant national authorities the judgment finding those accused guilty of a crime(s) that has brought about injury to a victim(s). At that point the victim is responsible to assert compensation before the competent domestic court. To this end, "the judgment of the Tribunal shall be final and binding as to the criminal responsibility of the convicted person for such injury."
Structure
To avoid favoring one country or region’s specific type of customary law, a custom of alternating between presidents drawn from Romano-Germanic and common law and legal traditions has occurred at the ICTY. To further avoid undue influence of one State, the Vice-President and the President of the ICTY and ICTR are elected for two years terms. The Appeals Chamber of both the ICTR and ICTY hold a seat for the president of the ICTY. With the proximity in dates of both genocides and tribunals creations, it seems appropriate for a dual judgeship at both proceedings.
Prosecutor
For the ICTY and ICTR, the Secretary General selects the Deputy Prosecutors and appoints the prosecutorial staffs based on the recommendation of the Prosecutor. Analogous to Executive Branch cabinet selections made by the US President and confirmed by the Senate, the Prosecutor does the recommending and the Secretary General does the vetting/confirming.
The Prosecutor of the ICTY has instituted multiple field offices in places including Sarajevo, Zagreb, Banja Luka, Pristina, Belgrade, and Skopje. In a welcome move of delegation, the ICTY Prosecutor has also recently commenced proceedings for referring cases to Croatia. Not without effort and debate, the ICTR Prosecutor has established a major field office in Kigali, and has considered establishing offices in Brussels and Kinshasa. The government of Rwanda in the end endorsed the Secretary-General’s counsel to base the ICTR in Arusha in an effort to, as then Rwandan Ambassador to the United Nations Manzi Bakuramutsa, said, to “foster a spirit of cooperation.” In an echo of Nuremberg historicity, the Security Council designated Arusha, site of the 1993 peace accords between Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), as the official seat of the ICTR and granted a further concession to the government of Kigali by granting discretion to the tribunal to hold trials elsewhere, including Rwanda. Despite this, the government never relinquished its bid to one day see international trials convened in Kigali and, over the years, has continued to press the tribunal to conduct some of the crimes against humanity and genocide trials in Rwanda. The continuing campaign by the government to move trials to Rwanda has maintained the issue of the tribunal’s remoteness in the media and the public eye.
Compulsory Procedure
As international establishments, the tribunals are almost entirely reliant upon the collaboration and cooperation of domestic justice authorities. The ICTY and ICTR statutes have not missed this fact and delineate the requirement of States to ‘comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Camber.’
Though used very rarely (once in the ICTY), convicted defendants may also be compelled to return to the Tribunal of their own trail and give testimony regarding the level of involvement and activity of other perpetrators. Despite the assistance such testimony may provide to the court, the ICTR has, unfortunately, had no such issue as the government has been reluctant to cooperate at any level let alone the transfer of convicted prisoners.
Article 29 of the Statute should be read as conferring on the ICTY “a power to require an international organization or its component organ such as the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) to cooperate with it.” In practice though, when UN officials testified before international tribunals, they have generally done so pursuant to a waiver of immunity from the jurisdiction. The value of the testimony of UN Officials who were present in the area and time of the conflict being tried warrants such immunity in most cases. A rogue UN soldier who engaged in committing the crimes against humanity is only one example of where tribunal immunity would be inappropriate.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber observed that States cannot be the subject of penalties or sanctions imposed by international courts, and (further) that the English version of the term ‘subpoena’ should not be interpreted as always meaning a compulsory order. The Tribunals cannot subpoena states or international organizations like the UN, or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, but recently has succeeded in detaining and trying culpable government leaders.
The concept of a Prosecutor guaranteeing immunity to persons in exchange for testimony against other perpetrators was “considered and rejected at the time the ICTY Statute was being drafted,” bringing another prominent difference between domestic criminal law trials and international proceedings to the forefront. It is doubtful that immunity from charges of crimes against humanity, war crimes, or genocide, in return for turning in other perpetrators would be acceptable to neither the non-UN international community nor the domestic victims of such crimes.
Burden of Proof
In the ICTY and ICTR the guilt of the accused must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and when questions of probative, prejudicial, and other forms of evidence arise, the ICTY and ICTR try to err on the side of caution and favor the accused. The ICTY has adopted a common-law tradition not only in this aspect of jurisprudence but in other procedural aspects, as will now be discussed, as well. This tendency to favor the accused, or at a minimum give them the benefit of the doubt, does not resolve the myriad obstacles that obstruct defense counsel selection, appointment, and argumentation. One such obstacle which has delayed proceedings at the ICTY is the multifaceted problems surrounding legal aid to indigent defendants. An inexhaustive description of additional defense hindrances faced by the ICTY, ICTR, and future international criminal tribunals include:

• The fees of defense counsel, what amount is adequate or fair and who should be responsible for such in the case of indigent perpetrators, and does any circumstance authorize the court to deny a defendant the right to represent himself/herself;

• Fee-splitting (“payment by a specialist such as a doctor, lawyer, or real estate broker of a part of his or her fee to the person who made the referral” ) and other forms of corruption much harder to detect in such paramount tribunals;

• The selection of defense counsel by the defendants when they possess adequate resources and by the court in the case of indigent perpetrators representation;

• Plea-bargaining which is gradually gaining speed in both the ICTY and ICTR;

• Sentencing of the accused and how inconsistencies in precedent, cooperation in trials, and conviction of some of the charges should necessitate clear guidelines;

• Defense council ethics and court-issued disciplinary actions, in the absence of regulatory licensing bodies able to give a rating on the conduct of defense attorneys (like the ABA), how is the ICTY or ICTR to know how ethical counsel will be?

Judges
Perhaps the second most important role in the international tribunals, after the prosecutor and defense councils and staffs, the judges of the ICTY and ICTR and their rules governing their stations are now solidifying and thereby strengthening future tribunals. The United Nations Security Council enlarged their authority so that they could assist in the pre-trial process in 2003. In the early years of the ICTY, when all three members of a Trial Chamber who were in the final stages of a complex and lengthy trial were not reelected, the UN Security Council approved a resolution permitting them to prolong their functions until the conclusion of the trial. Later, in 2005, the ICTY Statute was modified to permit ad litem judges to be eligible for re-election and, if successful, preside in a “new set of trials for a second period not to exceed three years.” At both tribunals, there exists a rotation of judges from the Trial Chambers to the Appeals Chamber. Though the President may provisionally appoint a member of a Trial Chamber or of the Appeals Chamber to another Chamber, if a judge leaves either the ICTY or ICTR before the end of the appointed term, the Secretary General has authority to appoint a replacement.
Jurisdiction
Crimes against humanity are at the core of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the three tribunals. The subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICTY and ICTR has a difficult task of being all engulfing of previous and new crimes against humanity, domestic and international, in addition to being specific enough to be viewed as valid, coherent precedent. The authority of both Courts consists of the crimes that the tribunals are authorized to put on trial. Specifically, crimes against humanity provisions utilized by the ICTY (found in Article 5 that is generally sculpted and built on article 6(c) of Nuremburg’s Charter) and that used by the ICTR (Article 3) differ from each other. Both chambers statutes contain stipulations regarding genocide, but the SCSL does not. Some of the judges at the ad hoc tribunals have, on occasion explained the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts as encircling “universally condemned offenses,” rather than demarcating each specific crime.
The perception that trials for crimes against humanity charges have provided international tribunals with the prospect of turning “a set of abstract concepts into a fully fledged and well-defined body of law” is interesting after one contemplates the prominent differences between the earlier definitions of crimes against humanity and those currently found in the statues of the ICTY and ICTR. For example, neither rape nor imprisonment was listed as punishable acts in the Nuremberg Charter. Rightfully, the addition of rape to the ICTY and ICTR statutes has often been referenced as a progressive advancement in international criminal law.
Another important difference is the armed conflict requirement. Thus far ICTY cases have expressed the presence of armed conflict in Article 5 of the Statute as a “purely jurisdictional requirement,” affirming that there is no obligation of a connection between an armed conflict and the punishable act. Apparently all that is necessary is proof “there was an armed conflict and that objectively the acts of the accused are linked geographically as well as temporally with the armed conflict.” The ICTY Appeals Chamber tried to purify the disparity thus: “The Appeals Chamber does not accept that the jurisdictional requirement of Article 5 requires the Prosecution to establish that an armed conflict existed within the state (or region) of the Former Yugoslavia in which the charged Article 5 crimes is alleged to have been committed.” The Appeals Chamber next gave a hypothetical scenario where crimes against humanity can occur outside of an international legally recognizable armed conflict.
To address State-sponsored discrimination and maltreatment of its own residents, which had beforehand eluded international criminal punishment, the concept of crimes against humanity was first created in the Nuremberg prosecutions. The early decisions at the IMT were divided as to whether the organizational policy/plan of a government was a component of crimes against humanity. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Kunarac case held that the policy constituent was not a constituent of crimes against humanity whatsoever when the alleged crimes occurred. Sustaining this position, the ICTY Appeals Chamber referenced many authorities, one of which was Eichmann. The evident contradiction between the Appeals Chamber’s interpretation of the requirements of customary international law and the text of the Rome Statues is worth mentioning. In earlier rulings it was held that ad hoc tribunals have on occasion been referred to as an “authoritative codification of customary international law.” However, article 10 of the Rome Statute asserts that it shall not “be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law.” Continuing, the judges of late appear to be taking the drafters at their word and adhering to more narrow philosophy. It remains unsatisfactory nothing additional has, thus far, been given by the Appeals Chamber as an explanation for its position. Nor even have many serious attempts been made to explain the inconsistency with the Rome Statute and the text of Article 7.
The fact that perpetrators, even government leaders are being put on trial, should show that progress has been made civilly and in jurisprudence over the last even 50 years. Perhaps this new precedent is due to the economic power of the regions of conflict. In the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, the Emperor was not put on trial nor presented as a witness at any point in the proceedings. Notwithstanding this ambitious addition of justly prosecuting government leaders, a large majority of residents in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia are unsatisfied with the Reponses of the ICTR and ICTY. This disappointment may be in part at least contributed to the (rightful or wrongful) acquittals of chambers, 6 from the ICTR and 10 from the ICTY so far. It is refreshing that acquittals have occurred and that every person brought to trial is not going to be convicted regardless of the examinations and evidence. A high conviction rate, after all, does not mean more justice has been administered.
Some believe that it can be stated, without a great deal of doubt, that the ICTY Statute drafters believed that such the limitation of crimes against humanity being committed in an armed conflict was imposed by customary international law, and that to prosecute these crimes in the absence of armed conflict would abuse the tenet nullum crimen sine lege ("no crime without law"). In the ICTY case of Tadic, the Appeals Chamber held that the necessity of armed conflict was not consistent with customary law, and its holding was consequently supported in the text of the Rome Statute of the ICC. The ICTY Appeals Chamber went on to explain that in “drafting Article 5 of the Tribunal’s Statute and imposing the additional jurisdictional requirement that crimes against humanity be committed in armed conflict, the Security Council intended to limit the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to those crimes which had some connection to armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia.” Schabas eloquently suggests an alternative explanation of the Secretariat lawyers “who drafted the Statute believed that the nexus with armed conflict was still, in 1993, an element of the customary law concept of crimes against humanity.” Today general agreement exists that crimes against humanity may also be perpetrated in times of peace; in the past however this was not always the case. The ICTY Statute is the only international tribunal that specifically refers to the occurrence of an armed conflict, stating that crimes against humanity are prosecutable “when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character.” The prerequisite that crimes against humanity be “committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal” has not been a standard clause or rule in other tribunals as the frequently accompanying offense of war crimes’ title itself suggests significant conflict. In Article 3 of the ICTR the word “directed” is replaced with “widespread or systematic attack” and the contextual setting of armed conflict is substituted with another requirement, explicitly that the attack be committed on “national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.”
Though the judges of the International Court of Justice canvassed in 2002 provided inconsistent views of universal jurisdiction, Schabas believes much support exists for the notion that international law permits the implementation of universal jurisdiction not only for crimes against humanity but for war crimes and genocide. Interestingly, and perhaps due to the recent conclusion of the Second World War, in 1948 the UN General Assembly rejected this same concept and proposal.
Some believe that a conviction, founded entirely on aiding and abetting, for the crime of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity, after the court and both parties accept that the accused party had no intention to commit these crimes, is deeply inconsistent and counterproductive. The most heinous of crimes warrants the inclusion, during the trial and satisfactory to at least a majority of the judges, of a verifiable mens rea.
Conclusion
The Dayton and Arusha Accords illustrate noteworthy attempts to resolve entrenched, long-standing conflicts on a lasting, sustainable basis. The fact that these accords were not sufficient suggests a necessary evolution toward a different model of conflict resolution than those employed in short-lived and centuries-old conflicts. The Arusha and Dayton peace processes more than sufficiently demonstrate this, and require a reframing of preceding approaches which the UN via the ICTR and ICTY have attempted to establish. The Arusha peace process entailed only one summit that occurred during the signing ceremony and the Dayton Accords entailed many similar meetings, both to no lasting avail. The commencement of negotiation processes in the future might do well to be predicated by clearly adequate evidence of the existence of constructive dispositions to a negotiated resolution among all involved participants. Prevention is easier than reparation, as over ten years and $300 million (USD) costs of the ICTR and ICTY illustrate. Ideally, arguing parties should arrive at such positive outlooks either on their own or through EU, US, and/or UN diplomatic incentives and assurances that discount the effectiveness of military solutions. In the absence of such an affirmative position, the process would be characterized more by pretentiousness than actual progress, as recent history has shown in the cease-fire negotiated in Rwanda in 1991 and the short-lived obedience to the Dayton Accords.
Notwithstanding these shortcomings and the somewhat fluid rulings of previous international criminal trials, the ICTY and ICTR are making positive progress and movement toward adequate retribution and punishment. While regional cooperation has been difficult to establish initially and even after several years in the ICTR, regional governments and mechanisms are beginning to contribute at an increased level to the tribunals of the UN. Though imperfect, these tribunals are much more beneficial than the alternative, i.e. an escape of accountability and prosecution of war criminals. Additional evidence that reconstruction is progressing occurred on April 11, 2002, when Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and six additional countries simultaneously deposited instruments of ratification to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, bringing the total number of States Parties to 66. These ratifications, pursuant to article 126 of the Treaty, caused the Statute to enter into force on July 1, 2002. As both tribunals have continued prosecuting war criminals, they are creating a more and more firm foundation for future international courts but need adequate sentencing. “Life in prison” cannot be seen as a just punishment for orchestrators of crimes against humanity.
 
References

1. ICTY Proceedings: Decision on the Motions of Drago Josipovic, Zoran Kupreškic and Vlatko Kupreškic to admit additional evidence pursuant to rule 115 and for judicial notice to be taken pursuant to rule 94(b): http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/acdec/en/10508AE315644.htm
2. Ibid.
3. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence: http://www.icls.de/dokumente/icty_rules.pdf
4. ICTY Decision on Defence Objections to the Admissibility of Witness 81’s Suspect Interview under Rule 95: http://icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/tdec/en/080708.pdf
5. ICTY: The Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Csae No. IT-95-14/1-AR73; “Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence.” http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/jud_supplement/supp2-e/aleks.htm
6. http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_organs/international_tribunals.shtml
7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 64, Section 2: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/99_corr/6.htm
8. Article 24(3) of the ICTY Statute: http://www.icls.de/dokumente/icty_statut.pdf
9. Rule 106(C) of the ICTY Statute
10. International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for Cooperation, p. 167. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
11. ICTY annual on Developed Practices: Pardon and Commutation of Sentence – Section D.4.1, pp. 162: http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/manual_developed_practices/icty_manual_on_developed_practices.pdf
12. Miriam Webster definition: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fee%20splitting
13. UN Doc. S/RES/1597 (2005) as referenced in The UN International Criminal Tribunals: the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. William Schabas, Cambridge University Press, 2006
14. Genocide in International Law: the Crimes of Crimes, William Schabas, Cambridge University Press, 2000. pg. 365
15. The UN International Criminal Tribunals: the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. William Schabas, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pg. 188
16. The UN International Criminal Tribunals: the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. William Schabas, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pg. 188
17. Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case No. IT-94-1-AR72), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, paragraph 141, as referenced in The Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Professor Igor Blishchenko (1930-2000) pg. 97
18. Article 10 of the Rome Statute
19. The UN International Criminal Tribunals: the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. William Schabas, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pg. 188
20. Ibid.
21. ICTY Appeals Judgment, Article 3 of the Statute: http://icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/jud_supplement/supp34-e/kunarac.htm
22. Ibid.
23. Article 3 of the ICTR
24. Article 3 of the ICTR